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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------




ELLIOT J. ANDERSON and 
MARY CHRISTINE ANDERSON, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
No. 16923 
---------------------------------------
This Court has established the rule that for a 
rehearing to be granted it is necessary for the petitioning 
party to show that the Court has misconstrued material 
facts, overlooked statutes or decisions which might affect 
the result, based the decision on wrong principles of law, 
or misapplied or overlooked something which materially 
affects the result. Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 
129 Pac. 619 (1919). 
Appellant believes that this criteria is met in 
this case since the majority opinion has created a serious 
inconsistency between the obligations of counsel and a 
trial court in the supervision and control of a verdict. 
In the majority opinion it is stated that plaintiff's 
• 
counsel waived the clearly erroneous form of the verdict 
since counsel did not request to see the verdict form and 
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consequently did not object to its inconsistency until 
after the jury had been excused. (Slip opinion, p. 5). 
The majority opinion quoted the Langton and Cohn cases in 
support of the proposition and concluded that "counsel 
has the obligation not only to object to the form of the 
verdict but to affirmatively seek to examine it." 
As a practical matter, the majority opinion has placed 
the entire burden of supervising a jury verdict upon 
counsel and has eliminated all burden upon the trial court. 
Under the majority's ruling once a verdict is rendered, 
counsel for the parties must demand to see it from the 
court or run the risk of waiving undisclosed defects. The 
court must show it to counsel in order to avoid the claim 
that counsel was not afforded opportunity to object. Counsel 
then must decide whether to request the jury verdict to be 
resubmitted to the court or to allow it to be entered. 
The trial court, under the majority's ruling, has no dis-
cretion or choice but to allow the counsel to take complete 
control as to what should occur with the verdict form. 
In the instant case, for example, the lower court 
incorrectly resubmitted the matter to the jury without 
counsel's specific request to do so since only counsel, 
under the majority opinion, has the responsibility to correct 
errors and request resubmission. 
Obviously, this scenario is inconsistent with 
Rule 47(r), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: 
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If the verdict rendered is informal 
or insufficient, it may be corrected 
by the jury under the advice of the 
court, or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
In addition, §78-7-5, U.C.A., provides that every 
court has the power: 
(5) to control in furtherance of justice 
the conduct of its ministerial officers, 
and all other persons in any manner con-
nected with a judicial proceeding before 
it in every matter pertaining thereto; and 
(8) to amend and control its process and 
orders so as to make them conformable to 
law and justice. 
It is well-established by this Court that a trial 
court must correct an error found by the trial court in 
the jury's deliberation and resubmit the matter to the 
jury for correction. Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934 
(Utah 1963). This principle was stated by the Court of 
Appeals of Oklahoma in Hamilton v. Duffy, 540 P.2d 600 
(C.T. App. Okla. 1975) where the court stated: 
It is the duty of the trial court to 
scrutinize both the form and the 
substance of any verdict which is 
returned to prevent insufficient or 
inconsistent findings from becoming 
a part of the record of the Court. 
It is normal and proper to ask the 
jury to correct a verdict which is 
insufficiently formulated, usually by 
returning to the jury room to deliberate 
further. The court is not bound to accept 
a verdict which is not in accordance with 
its instructions. Where jurors return a 
verdict which is incomplete or ambiguous 
the court should direct them to retire 
for further deliberations. Id. at 602 
(Citations omitted, emphasis added.) 
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It is obvious that there is an inconsistency now 
created by this Court's majority opinion. In effect, this 
Court has stated that counsel is given the right and 
obligation to examine each verdict as it is returned by 
the jury. The trial court has no discretion to refuse such 
a request since to do so might result in prejudicial error. 
The trial court, under the majority opinion, therefore, 
cannot on its own initiative return a verdict for further 
deliberation without a specific request having been entered 
by the counsel for either party. This is contrary to the 
above-cited statutes, rules, and case law which obviously 
vest the trial court with considerable discretion in this 
regard. 
The Johnson v. Simons case cited by the majority 
opinion contained a similar problem to the instant case. 
Here, it is undisputed that the clerk incorrectly read the 
verdict form, thereby failing to alert plaintiff's counsel 
to the inconsistency existing. In Johnson, the trial court, 
during a conference, agreed to give a certain instruction 
concerning contributory negligence but actually failed to 
do so. Counsel was not given a copy of the instruction 
until after the jury had been released. The dissenting 
opinion written by Justices Ellott and Henroid noted the 
lack of opportunity of counsel to object to the erroneous 
omission of the instruction. The dissenting opinion 
stated: 
-4-
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It seems rather obvious that it would be 
difficult for counsel, listening to the 
reading of the long set of instructions 
to recall just what was given, and ' 
this would especially be true where the 
judge had lulled counsel into a feeling 
of security by promising to give the 
substance of a particular instruction. 
Id. at 518. 
In Johnson, even though it was difficult for counsel 
to detect the missing instruction, it was still possible 
by carefully listening to what was said in open court. 
In this case, it was not possible for counsel to detect the 
defective verdict without actually seeing it. Contrary to 
the statement of the majority opinion , counsel was not 
shown the verdict form at the bench conference with Judge 
Banks nor did the judge disclose the verdict's contents. 
The majority opinion has created a situation in 
which counsel can no longer trust the actions of either 
the clerks or the court. For example, in order ~o avoid 
waiving instructions to the jury counsel can no longer rely 
upon the fact that the court claims to submit the same 
written instructions to the jury as has been read. If 
the court or the clerk mistakenly submit erroneous instruc-
tions to the jury which have not been previously read by 
the court, counsel would be deemed to have waived any 
objection since counsel did not examine the exact instructions 
submitted to the jury but relied upon the representation 
of the court that the same instructions would actually be 
submitted to the jury room. Likewise, each time a verdict 
is read in the district court it will be incumbent upon 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
counsel to demand to see the verdict form regardless of 
how simple .·it may be in its reading in order to insure 
that the clerk or the court has not mistakenly omitted 
or included parts of the verdict form. Counsel can no 
longer accept what the trial court states as the verdict 
or what the clerk states as the verdict to rely upon 
since, under the majority opinion, even if the court or 
the clerk mistakenly or deliberately misreads the verdict 
form, it is counsel, not the court or the court personnel, 
which must bear the responsibility for the error. 
The burden placed upon counsel in this case is 
unreasonable and contrary to the rule requiring the trial 
court to also have responsibility for the supervision of the 
court personnel and verdict form. To take an extreme 
example, suppose that a trial has developed between a 
plaintiff and defendant on the question of negligence. 
Special interrogatories are asked, just as in the instant 
case, in which the jury answers that the defendant was 
negligent, that the negligence of the defendant was not a 
proximately cause of the accident, and finds damages in 
favor of plaintiff for $20,000. The trial court sees that 
the form is inconsistent since damages are found even 
though the defendant is not proximately related to the 
accident. Nevertheless, the court allows the clerk to 
read the verdict form. The clerk misreads the second 
answer and declares that the defendant's conduct was a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. Counsel for the defendant has 
-6-
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nothing to object to since the verdict as read sounds 
consistent. The jury is excused. The verdict form is 
later examined by counsel and an objection is made. The 
trial court overrules the objection by stating that 
counsel should have demanded to see the verdict form 
before the jury was excused and therefore any erroneous 
form is waived. 
In this extreme example the lower court completely 
failed to supervise its court personnel in the reading 
of the verdict and failed to note the inconsistency of 
the verdict form. Nevertheless, under the majority's 
opinion the verdict would stand since defense counsel 
failed to object to an unobjectionable verdict form as 
read. The instant case is indeed unusual. It is an 
i~stance where the court clerk omitted to read the very 
essence of the verdict form which made it appear incon-
sistent. Such an occasion is admittedly rare, but the 
principle remains the same. It is contrary to Utah law, 
Utah Rules of Procedur~ and this Court's prior decisions 
to place the burden of erroneous readings of verdicts upon 
counsel and not upon the court who, in this case, had 
examined the verdict form and knew or should have known 
. 
that parts of the form had been omitted, when read by 
the clerk. 
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For this reason, appellant respectfully requests 
that a rehearing be granted solely as to the question of 
waiver and the burdens imposed upon counsel under the 
various aspects of Utah law in order to allow a full 
briefing and hearing upon the matters raised herein. 
1981. 
Respectfully submitted this S).. 4: day of September, 
MAX D. WHEELER 
IC\) S:'"" COOK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
P. O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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